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FOREWORD
For the past quarter of a century the Cyprus Ques­
tion has been one of the most important issues in 
Greek politics. Indeed at certain critical junctures 
this problem had a determining impact on the course 
of Greek political history. This has become abundant­
ly clear since the dramatic events of the summer of 
1974: the relentless search of a «solution» to the 
Cyprus problem not only contributed decisively to 
the advent of the military dictatorship in 1967 but it 
also was one of the decisive factors which led to its 
disintegration seven years later in the wake of its 
fatal adventure in Cyprus. Developments since the 
collapse of the junta and the return of parliamentary 
government in Greece, have made it increasingly 
apparent that the future of democracy in this country 
will be once again closely connected with the evolution 
of the Cyprus problem and its ramifications on the 
foreign relations of Greece.
Besides this critical importance for Greek politics 
the fate of Cyprus especially in its current phase de­
mands attention on its own merit. The intense suffer­
ing of the people of Cyprus calls urgently for clar­
ification of the processes that led up to their tragedy. 
In addition the Cyprus affair can be very instructive 
concerning the nature of contemporary international 
politics in general and power configurations in the 
Middle East in particular. The turn of events in 
Cyprus since the summer of 1974 also pose, with great 
urgency, the problem of survival of smaller nations 
in the contemporary international system. The con­
creteness with which this problem was posed in Cyprus, 
has turned the cause of the island and its people not 
only into a challenge to the conscience of the world 
but also into a testing ground for all those institutions 
and values which embody humanity’s best hopes.
The above are just a few hints at the enormity of 
the problem of Cyprus and the consequent need of 
enlightened discussion, information and awareness 
about all its dimensions. The current crisis and the 
debates over possible settlements have underlined 
the necessity of a better understanding of the problem 
if the errors of omission and commission of the past 
are to be avoided. As a contribution in this direction 
we present in this issue of the Review a paper by 
two political scientists working in American Univer­
sities, on the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Inadequate 
knowledge or disregard of the real issues in this 
conflict has led Cyprus from one tragedy to the next. 
We hope that the substantive information and inter­
pretative arguments presented in this well documented 
paper will stimulate interest in this grave problem by 
placing it in its proper perspective.
THE EDITORS
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introductory
Social change has been viewed by successive gen­
erations of scholars and by diverse theoretical 
doctrines as a process of development and improve­
ment with generally desirable consequences. The 
origins of this understanding which has conditioned 
many theories of modernization, can be traced back 
in the Enlightenment idea of progress and in nine­
teenth century social optimism over the prospects 
of humanity—as well as in an unstated belief in the 
universal relevance of the Western liberal experience. 
Nevertheless the actual experience of the transition 
from traditional to modernizing society which at a 
heightened pace has been under way on a global 
scale since the second World War, has beclouded 
the long cherished optimism by dramatizing the enor­
mous costs at which change is achieved. Indeed one 
could say that this new awareness of the price of 
change is alerting the attention of social theorists to a 
problem that the achievements of Western society 
have tended to obscure: the heavy human and other 
costs which had to be paid in the long process towards 
the consolidation of modernity in Europe and North 
America.
In our recent experience the most telling indication 
of the costs of change, has been the increase in the 
incidence and scale of violence within changing so­
cieties. The decade of the 1960s has been marked by a 
generalized rise in the occurrence of civil violence in 
both modernizing and highly advanced societies. 
Civil violence accompanies the movement of social 
change and tends to assume the form either of prae- 
torianism in the absence of effective political institu­
tions, social revolution against existing social and 
political structures or communal conflicts over the 
scope of a political system in encompassing diverse 
ethnic groups and national communities.1
Communal violence and ethnic conflicts have ap­
peared with increasing frequency and intensity since 
the dissolution of the colonial empires in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The first instance of widespread ethnic 
violence has accompanied the attainment of Indian 
independence in 1947 and the partition of the Indian 
subcontinent. By the 1960s communal conflicts had 
erupted in many other recently independent states 
but in a variety of forms ethnic divisions were inten­
sified to the point of violent explosions in advanced, 
post-industrial societies (notably the United States) 
as Well. In view of this generalized experience it has 
been persuasively suggested that modernization fos­
ters ethnic conflict as social mobilization and the
1. See Samuel P. Huntington, «Civil Violence and the Pro­
cess of Development,» Adelphi Papers, Number 83 (December 
1971), pp. 1-15. Civil violence is used here to denote violence 
within states in contradistinction to international violence.
politicization of primordial attachments tend to 
disrupt the fragile structures of ethnically diverse 
societies. Modernization tends to intensify and poli­
ticize rather than stamp out ethnic diversity.2 It 
would seem nevertheless that ethnic conflicts in de­
veloping and highly advanced societies coming as 
they do at different points in the continuum of social 
change, are not exactly identical phenomena and con­
sequently explanatory theories of ethnic conflicts will 
have to consider this distinction and account for the 
differences.
Although older scholarly orthodoxy regarding 
the relation between modernization and ethnic in­
tegration has been incisively criticized, still a great 
deal has to be learnt about ethnicity and ethnic con­
flicts for the existing lacunae and deficiencies in the 
theoretical literature to be remedied.3 Before attempt­
ing generalizations and theory building it is best to 
proceed inductively by looking at the dynamics of 
particular conflicts. The following analysis if the ethnic 
conflict in Cyprus is attempted in this spirit. We hope 
that the empirical evidence from the study ol the 
sources, conditions and various characteristics ot the 
conflict between the two Cypriot ethnic communities 
offered here, Will contribute towards the development 
of a more effective conceptualization for the compar­
ative analysis of ethnic conflict.
dimensions of the latest tragedy
Developments in Cyprus in the late 1960s and early 
1970s were marked by a general relaxation of ethnic 
tensions, economic boom and a continuing inter­
communal effort in search of a negotiated settlement 
of the ethnic conflict in accordance with the basic 
needs and requirements of both ethnic communities. 
The constructive involvement of the United Nations 
in containing friction and in reducing the level of 
confrontation by means of the policing and medi­
ating activities of the UN Cyprus peace keeping force 
(UNFICYP) in the military field, as well as in pro­
moting a resumption of Greek-Turkish Cypriot con­
tacts aimed at reaching a commonly acceptable con­
stitutional arrangement in the political sphere, had 
set in motion several hopeful trends foreshadowing a
2. See WalkerConnor, «Self Determination: The New Phase,» 
World Politics, voi. 20, no. 1 (October 1967), pp. 30-53 and 
idem. «Nation Building or Nation Destroying,» World Politics, 
voi. 24, no. 3 (April 1972), pp. 319-355. For a recent analy­
sis of the »elation between social change and ethnic conflict 
see Daniel Bell, «Ethnicity and Social Change» in Ethnicity'· 
Theory and Experience, ed. by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. 
Moynihan, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 
141-174.
3. The recent volume edited by Glazet ana Moynihan, Eth­
nicity, op. cit., is a significant contribution but does not 
cover the experience of all ethnically diveise societies.
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successful resolution of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus.
Noting all this an observer might have concluded 
that Cyprus could potentially develop into a paradig­
matic case of conflict resolution Which in a compar­
ative perspective could be of considerable value 
as a model to other ethnically troubled parts of 
the World. At the same time however, observing the 
growth of terrorist extremism on the right Wing frin­
ges of the Greek Cypriot community, the procrasti­
nation and repeated delays in the intercommunal 
negotiations and the escalation of covert and overt 
foreign interference in the affairs of Cyprus, one 
Was also becoming increasingly aware of the dangers 
of a new catastrophic explosion.
During the first half of the year 1974 a series of 
events which largely fell beyond the Cypriots’ own 
control, led to the realization of the second ot the two 
possible scenarios outlined above. The strained re­
lations between the democratically elected govern­
ment of Cyprus’ President Archbishop Makarios 
with the military dictatorship then ruling Greece, 
culminated in the coup of July 15, 1974. The coup 
was planned in Athens and executed by the Greek 
officers of the Cyprus National Guard and the Greek 
military contingent stationed in Cyprus (in accord­
ance with the 1960 Treaty of Alliance).
The coup met with considerable armed resistance 
and caused violence and bloodshed among the Greek 
Cypriots but it managed to set up a short-lived pup­
pet regime. Archbishop Makarios was rescued out 
of Cyprus by the United Nations forces and the Bri­
tish Royal Air Force. Realizing the dangers involved 
in their adventure, the anti-Makarios putschists 
avoided systematically to attack or threaten the Tur­
kish Cypriots and appealed to them to cooperate with 
the new regime for a continuation of the intercommu­
nal discussions.
The overthrow of the legitimate constitutional 
order, however, afforded a perfect opportunity for 
Turkey to execute a policy adopted since the 1950s. 
This policy aimed at the partition of Cyprus. Seizing 
the pretext furnished by the coup and arguing that 
Cyprus’ independence had been violated by Greece, 
while also invoking her rights and obligations under 
the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to intervene and restore 
the upset status quo, Turkey mounted an invasion of 
Cyprus with air, sea and land forces in the early hours 
of Saturday, July 20, 1974. Britain, also a guarantor 
of Cyprus’ independence, had earlier in the week re­
refused a Turkish proposal for a joint intervention.
In the battle of Cyprus that raged between the 20th 
and the 22nd of July 1974, the invading Turkish 
forces, despite superior numbers and equipment, 
suffered many losses and met with fierce resistance 
on the part of the poorly armed and badly organized 
Cyprus National Guard. When a cease-fire was ar- 
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ranged by the United Nations in the afternoon of 
July 22nd the Turkish forces had managed to es­
tablish themselves on a limited beachhead west of 
Kyrenia on the northern coast of Cyprus. After re­
peatedly violating several cease-fire agreements— 
including one signed at Geneva by the Foreign Mi­
nisters of Great Britain, Turkey and Greece on the 
30th of July 1974—the invading Turkish forces pro­
ceeded on August 14-15 on a new offensive which 
culminated in the partition of Cyprus along a line 
running from Kokkina in the west through the Tur­
kish quarter of Nicosia to Famagusta in the east. 
The occupied area includes the entire Kyrenia dis­
trict, the western and northern regions of Nicosia 
district, almost all of Famagusta district with the 
Karpass peninsula and parts of Larnaca district- 
in all about forty per cent of the territory of the Re­
public of Cyprus. The map that appears in Figure 
I shows the advances of the occupation forces in 
Cyprus.1
These events have left Cyprus in an immense 
human tragedy. The human toll of the violence has 
been five thousand dead and up to fifteen thousand 
wounded. In addition there are about three thousand 
missing persons, especially young men who vanished 
during the fighting in the summer of 1974. All this 
gave rise to a sense of grief which permeated all 
aspects of life in Cyprus in the several months fol­
lowing the invasion.
As a result of the invasion, the war and the occu­
pation of northern Cyprus, a refugee wave has up­
rooted one third of the population of Cyprus from 
their homes. Out of a population of approximately 
650 thousand an estimated 180,800 Greek Cypriots 
and about 17,000 Turkish Cypriots have become 
refugees. The predicament of these people is de­
scribed in Table I which presents a detailed account of
]. As of this writing sources on the 1974 crisis include 
mainly press reports and primary documents. For good poli­
tical accounts by an experienced journalist see the series of 
articles by Stanley Karnow in the New Republic, September 
7 to October 5, 1975 and idem. «America’s Mediterranean 
Bungle,» The Atlantic, February 1975 (voi. 235, no. 2), pp. 
6 tf. Useful reports on the eri is have appeared in all 
major news publications. Note for instance The New York 
Times, September 9, 1974, p. 8 and Le Monde Diplomatique, 
August 1974, no. 245, pp. 1, 4-6. The following Congressional 
documents contain valuable information on the crisis and the 
role of the United States : House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Subcommittee on Europe, Cyprus 1974, Hearings, 93rd Con­
gress, Second Session, August 19 and 20, 1974, Washington, 
D.C., 1974 ; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Refugees, Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus, Hearings, 
93rd Congress, Second Session, Seprember 26, 1974, Washing­
ton D.C., 1974 and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom­
mittee on Refugees, Crisis on Cyprus : 1974, Study Mission 
Report, 93rd Congress, Second Session, October 14, 1974, 
Washington D.C., 1974.
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the various categories of persons who have been 
affected by the war and the occupation.* 1
As the winter of 1974-75 set in, the most acute prob­
lem was that of shelter and accomodation since many 
refugee camps became uninhabitable with the coming 
of rainy and windy weather. Although most of the 
refugees have found shelter in all sorts of available 
structures from schools and monasteries to stables 
and warehouses or managed to squeeze in with friends 
and relatives, there are an estimated twenty thousand 
who still remain under inadequate shelter and thus 
are exposed to the vicissitudes of changing weather. 
As of this writing the Cypriot refugees are facing their 
second Winter under tents. Relief pouring in from 
Greece, the Hellenic diaspora and international 
organizations (United Nations and International Red 
Cross) has been barely sufficient to cover the essen­
tials of subsistence.
TABLE I : Displaced Persons and Others in Need on Cyprus 
fas of November 1, 1974)
I. Refugees :
1. Greek Cypriots in Governmnet-controlled areas :
Satisfactorily sheltered with friends/relatives
or in second homes rented 57,600
Living in public buildings, schools, etc. 5,800
Housed in permanent structures, but over­
crowded conditions & will have to move 89,700
Living in shacks, garages, unfinished struc­
tures 11,000
Living in tents 9,000
Living in the open, under trees, in makeshift
open shelters 7,700
Total 180,800
2. Turkish Cypriots in Government-controlled areas:
Living in tents on British Sovereign Base areas 8,500 
In isolated villages, cut off, or in controlled
villages /enclaves 22,000
Total 30,500
3. Greek Cypriots in Turkish-occupied areas :
Living in cut off villages, or displaced 9,000
4. Turkish Cypriot refugees in Turkish-occupied areas :
Moved from the south to the north, and in­
cludes some refugees from 1963-64 8,500
II. Prisoners of war and detainees, both sides :
All have been released under UN auspices 6,000
Total 234,800
Source: Crisis on Cyprus : 1974 (Study Mission Report of the 
Subcommittee on Refugees of the US Senate Committee on the Ju­
diciary, Oct. 24, 1974), p. 19.
1. Detailed documentation on the problem of the refugees 
is available in the Study Mission Report Crisis on Cyprus 
1974, cited above, pp. 18-43 and in Senate Committee of the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Refugees, World Hunger, Health 
and Refugee Problems, Part V: Human Disasters in Cyprus, 
Bangledesh, Africa. Hearings, 93rd Congress, Second Session, 
August 20, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 1-23, 163-196. 
For the human aspect of the refugee problem see the two 
articles by Brigadier Michael Harbottle in The Times (Lon­
don), October 17 and 21. 1974.
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All this is just the material and tangible dimension 
of refugee life. The whole ordeal has affected deeply 
the Cypriots’ outlook on life and the confident opti­
mism bred by the prosperity of the recent past has 
been gradually replaced by a sense of desperation 
and anguish. Out of this grows a living conscious­
ness and appreciation of the tribulations of other 
peoples who had been less fortunate than the Cy­
priots in their recent history.
The intense human suffering of the refugees has 
been, of course, the most serious of Cyprus’ recent 
problems. However, there have been many other 
problems as well. The coup, the war and the occu­
pation shattered the island’s flourishing economy. 
The sheer physical destruction has been enormous: 
it began with the demolition of public buildings the 
day of the coup and culminated with the raids of the 
Turkish airforce which set huge areas of Cyprus’ 
best forests afire and bombed to ruins hospitals, 
schools, hotels, industrial buildings and tourist 
attractions. Then came the looting of the occupied 
areas and the destruction of a great part of the crops 
and livestock all over northern Cyprus. Preliminary 
estimates of overall economic damage and material 
destruction as of September 1974, put the costs 
up to the equivalent of the expenditures of the last 
eleven years in Cyprus’ general budget.2
As a consequence of the fact that the most im­
portant of Cyprus’ natural resources and the most 
economically developed areas are m the occupied nor­
thern region, the economy suffered huge losses in 
production, exports and tourism. It has been esti­
mated that about 4.5 million dollars in economic pro­
duction were lost every day during the several months 
after the invasion. In addition, there are the losses 
resulting from the idleness forced on the refugees— 
roughly one third of the economically active popula­
tion—and the costs of their maintenance estimated 
at 4.6 million dollars a month.
The economic growth and prosperity of the past 
ten years have accumulated enough reserves to meet 
the emergencies of the first several months but the 
extent of the devastation has been such thatthe out­
look for the future appears very grim indeed unless 
normal economic activities are resumed immediate­
ly.3
2. According to a Memorandum made available to the 
authors by the Government of Cyprus, some quantitative indi­
cators of destruction are the following : (a) Overall economic 
damage : 350 million Cyprus pounds ; (b) Damage to household 
properties : 100 million Cyprus pounds ; (c) Forest destroyed : 
100 square miles (20% of the total forested area in Cyprus) ; 
(d) Losses from tourism : 30 million Cyprus pounds.
3. See the reports in The New York Times, January 27, 
1975, p. 12 and ibid., January 29,1975,p. 6 and Christian Science 
Monitor, January 8, 1975, p. 3A. The Planning Bureau of the 
Republic of Cyprus has compiled a useful factual report :
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The picture of human pain and material destruc­
tion that opens this paper, conveys just a dim sense 
of the tragedy that has so suddenly replaced Cyprus’ 
many achievements and hopes in her fourteen years 
of independent statehood. Still our distressing de­
scription has not so far accounted for the origins of 
the conflict and the historical sequences of events that 
led up to today’s depressing situation. Although the 
humanitarian facet of the problem certainly looms 
larger than anything else in the wake of the latest 
crisis, there is a background in politics and conflict 
which must be examined if the whole issue is to be 
comprehended. Indeed, Cyprus’ grievous experience 
underscores the urgency of the problems raised by 
ethnic conflicts and points up the pressing need to 
attain a better understanding of the issues involved 
—in the hope that out of our analytical efforts more 
appropriate and humane resolution strategies will 
develop.
In the following pages we will try to present first 
a general survey of the politics of ethnic conflict 
in Cyprus and then we will outline and evaluate a 
number of initiatives, attempted at a variety of lev­
els, aiming at a resolution of the problem in one 
direction or another. Our purpose is to present a 
general political profile of the ethnic conflict in Cy­
prus by drawing on the relevant material that has 
been made available by considerable scholarly re­
search and the publication of pertinent primary sour­
ces. We hope that our survey of sources and research 
and our outline of events and problem-areas will 
provide an adequate introduction to the general prob­
lem of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Although our focus 
remains political, We appreciate the need of a com­
parative study of the deep historical roots and the 
structural and attitudinal dynamics of the conflict 
between the two Cypriot communities.1 A few relevant 
hints offered in the following pages, are meant to 
suggest the direction that future research should fol­
low.
the politics of ethnic conflict: 
from coexistensé to segregation
The origins of the contemporary problem of Cy­
prus go back to the Ottoman conquest of the island 
from the Venetians in 1570-71. The most momentous 
effect of the Turkish conquest was the creation of a
Economic Consequences of Turkish Invasion·, Nicosia, Pub­
lic Information Office. October, 1974.
1. For an analysis of these aspects of the problem see the 
interpretative essay by Paschalis M. Kitromilides, «Cyprus : 
The Nature of Ethnic Conflict,» in Th. A. Couloumbis and 
S. M. Flicks, eas., US Foreign Policy toward Greece and 
Cyprus (Washington, D.C., The Center for Mediterranean 
Studies, 1975), pp. 83-97.
Moslem minority in Cyprus. According to Ottoman 
practice, part of the invading forces settled in Cy­
prus as sipahis—or military landholders—taking 
over as their timars or chifliks the feudal estates of the 
former Frankish nobility. If these were the original 
forefathers of the Turkish minority, its numbers Were 
soon swelled by the Islamization of Greek inhabitants 
who were induced to escape that lot of subject rayas 
by joining the religion and enjoying the privileges 
of the ruling millet.2 These Islamizations can be sys­
tematically documented from tax registers which have 
survived from the period of Turkish occupation. 
There is convincing evidence that there were conver­
sions of Greek Cypriot villagers to Islam as late as 
1825-28. The best testimony however is afforded 
by the names of Christian saints borne by several 
Turkish villages in Cyprus—e.g., St. John, St. Nicho­
las, St. George—and the fact that until recently 
many of the Turkish Cypriots, especially in the Pa­
phos area, were in fact Greek speaking Moslems.3
These Moslems lived in peace With the Greek Cyp­
riots who formed the overwhelming majority of 
the population throughout the centuries of the Tur­
kish occupation of Cyprus—thus extending to Cyprus 
the pattern of peaceful symbiosis of Orthodox Chris­
tian and Moslem peasants that obtained in Anatolia, 
especially in such areas as Cappadocia and Pontos, 
until the Greeks were expelled from Asia Minor in 
1922-24. This peaceful coexistence manifested itself 
in a shared folk piety and a common life style that 
survived intact in those areas of Asia Minor that 
remained away from the battlegrounds of the Greek- 
Turkishwar that raged during 1919-1922 in Western 
Anatolia. The memories of this peaceful past are 
still invoked by the moving receptions of those Greeks 
who in recent years have been returning to visit 
their erstwhile villages. The same is largely true of 
those parts of rural Cyprus where Greeks and Turks 
lived in mixed or neighboring villages. In this context 
an undeniable tradition of mutual help and cordiali-
2. For the meaning of millet and the millet system see 
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 335.
3. For the history of Cyprus as an Ottoman province see 
Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, Vol., IV, Cambridge, 
At the Univenity Press, 1952, Part I (pp. 1-400); Sir Harry 
C. Luke, Cyprus under the Turks 1571-1878, London, Oxford, 
University Press, 1921; Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History 
London, Zeno Publishers, 1955, pp. 234-301.
For the ethnological evolution of the population of Cyprus 
in this period see Theodore Papadopoullos, Social and Histo­
rical Data on Population, 1570-1881, Nicosia, Cyprus Re­
search Centre, 1965. For the problem of conversions to Islam 
see the evidence presented in Idem, «Πρόσ©οίτοι ’Εξισλαμισμοί 
’Αγροτικού Πληθυσμού έν Κύτρφ» (Recent Islamizations of 
Rural Population in Cyprus), Κυπριακοί Σπουδαί, Vol. 29, 
1965, pp. 27-48. Cf. C.F. Beckingham, «The Turks of Cyprus,» 
The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Voi. 87, 
Part II, July-December 1957, pp. 165-174.
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ty in the personal sphere survived the vicissitudes 
of political history.1
This was the social legacy of intercommunal re­
lations inherited by the British when they took over 
the administration of Cyprus in 1878 in the context 
of a rearrangement of power relations in the Near 
East sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin.2 In the span 
of eighty years of British rule between 1878 and the 
late 1950s, only one minor incident of intercommunal 
violence is reported.3
It is true that in the intricate politics of the Legis­
lative Council which functioned from 1881 to 1931, 
the colonial rulers managed repeatedly to play the 
representatives of the two communities against each 
other.4 Political representation in the Legislative 
Council reflected the traditional Ottoman system 
of social organization based on religious communities 
(millets) which was retained by the British and formed 
the fundamental principle of their handling of the 
politics of Cyprus. In the context of this policy the 
millet system was gradually politicized and provided 
the organizational foundation for the national differ­
entiation of the Cypriots.5 Despite this process 
Which was encouraged by British policy, the Turkish 
members of the Council sided occasionally with their 
Greek compatriots to promote the common interes ts 
of the island, especially regarding taxation and fi­
nance. Even over the issue of Enosis, the demand for 
union with Greece for which the Greek Cypriots 
had been clamoring for generations, the two commu­
nities did not come to blows. True, the Turkish Cy­
priot leaders registered consistently their opposition 
to Enosis but this disagreement was never strained 
so far as to be expressed in violence.
1. For the historical character of the phenomenon of 
Greek-Turkish symbiosis see the monumental work by Spercs 
Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Mi­
nor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh to the 
Fifteenth Century, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 
1971, especially pp. 444-497. Cf. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 
«Ό έξισλαμισμός xfjç Μικρός ’Ασίας καί οί Ιστορικές κατα­
βολές των έλληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων» (The Islamization 
of Asia Minor and the Historical Origins of Greek-Turkish 
Relations», Μικρασιατικά Χρονικά, vol. XVI (to be published 
1975).
2. For a detailed account see D.E. Lee, Great Britain and 
the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, Harvard Historical 
Studies, no. 38, Cambridge, Mass., 1934.
3. Hill, A History of Cyprus, op. cit., pp. 518-19.
4. For politics under the British ibid., Part II and Alastos, 
Cyprus in History, op. cit., pp. 302-381. For the earlier pe­
riod of British rule the most detailed account is that by Phi- 
lios Zannetos, 'Ιστορία τής Νήσου Κύπρου άπό τής 'Αγγλι­
κής κατοχής μέχρι σήμερον, (History of the Island of Cy­
prus from the British occupation to the present day), voi. 
II, Larnaca, 1911.
5. For an analysis of this process see Adamantia Pollis, 
«Systemic Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in 
Cyprus,» paper presented at the International Studies Asso­
ciation Convention, Washington, D.C., February 1975, pp.
14-21.
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The Enosis movement emerged in the 19th century 
and it essentially represented an extension to Cy­
prus of the wider historical phenomenon of European 
nationalism. In its social character and political 
aspirations the Enosis movement Was similar to the 
Italian Risorgimento, the movement for German 
unification and the irredentist movements of the Bal­
kan nations. Similar Enosis movements aspiring at 
unification with the Kingdom of Greece had develop­
ed in Crete, Macedonia and the Seven Ionian islands 
in the 19th century. Timid under the Ottomans in the 
19th century, the Enosis movement Was intensified 
under the British and reached a peak in the nationa­
list rebellion of October 1931.6 Meanwhile, in 1925 
Cyprus had become a British Crown colony after 
Turkey had renounced all rights of sovereignty over 
the island by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.7
The 1931 uprising, aspiring to Enosis with Greece, 
was forcefully put down by the British and the civil 
liberties of the Cypriots were suppressed. The repres­
sion of all political life and national expression that 
followed this uprising, was largely responsible for 
the intrasigence that the Enotist leaders manifested 
in dealing with the constitutional proposals of the 
British government after the Second World War.
In the wake of the Second World War the national 
demands of the Cypriots were formulated as a claim 
of self-determination in the context of the movement 
of decolonization.8 A plebiscite organized by the 
Ethnarcby of Cyprus in 1950—after the British rul­
ers refused to conduct one—showed an overwhelm­
ing majority of the Greek Cypriots favoring union 
with Greece.9 The British relused to discuss the 
future of Cyprus even in the face of increasing po­
litical agitation in the island.10 The subsequent intran-
6. The account of the Enosis movement in Hill, op. cit., 
pp. 488-568 is very detailed but obviously biased and lacks 
any wider perspective. It should be read in the light of Alastos, 
op. cit., pp. 330 ff. and Michel Dendias, La Question Cypriote 
aux points de vue historique et de droit international, Paris, 
Sirey, 1934 which is still the most adequate treatment of the 
Enosis movement.
The best account of the 1931 uprising is still perhaps that 
by Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1931, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1932, pp. 354-394.
7. Cf. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Lausanne 
on July 24, 1923, Cmd 1929, London, H.M. Stationary Office, 
1923. Note Article 16 (p. 21) by which Tutkey renounces all 
rights of sovereignty on territories outside her frontiers as 
specified in the treaty ; and Article 20 (p. 23) by which Turkey 
recognizes the annexation of Cyprus by Britain.
8. Developments in Cyprus between 1946-1959 are cov­
ered in detail in the recent two volume work of François 
Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959, Brussels, Bruylant, 
1973.
9. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 266-277. For the reactions of the 
Turkish Cypriots, pp. 303-307.
10. Survey of International Affairs 1954, by Coral Bell, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 173-184. The 
British attitude was expressed in the refusal of Prime Minis-
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sigence growing on all sides in the years 1950-1955, 
culminated in an anticolonial guerilla rebellion lasting 
between 1955 and 1959 and spearheaded by EOKA, 
the underground National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters.1
Until then the conflict had been primarily between 
the Greek Cypriots and the British while the Turkish 
Cypriots remained relatively uninvolved. It Was not 
until 1957-58 that the tensions prevailing in Cyprus 
generated intercommunal violence on a considerable 
scale for the first time. The eruption of ethnic vio­
lence in the late 1950s came as the result of a process 
of increasing differentiation between the two Cypriot 
communities which had until then coexisted in a tra­
ditional society. Socioeconomic modernization, slow 
but steady under the British, and the spread of lit­
eracy transformed the traditional religious and 
linguistic differences into the bases of the develop­
ment of a distinct Greek and a distinct Turkish na­
tional consciousness. In the political sphere, as nation­
alism grew among Greek Cypriots and as demands 
for broader political participation rose against Brit­
ish colonial rule, the Turkish Cypriots as well be­
came increasingly conscious of their ethnic identity 
and their rights of participation in Cypriot affairs. 
Further, as the educational systems of the two com­
munities were modeled on those of Greece and Tur­
key respectively, the symbolism of nationalist antag­
onism that grew out of the long historical confron­
tation of the two nations, Was transposed to Cyprus. 
As a result of all this a commonly shared system of 
social communication that could conceivably form 
the basis of an integrated society, was precluded 
from developing.2
ter Eden to discuss the future of Cyprus with Greek Prime 
Minister Papagos and in the statement by the Minister of 
State at the Colonial Office Henry Hopkinson in the House of 
Commons that change of sovereignty over Cyprus could not 
be contemplated. All this could and was interpreted by the 
Greek government and the Greek Cypriots to mean that a settle­
ment through direct Anglo-Greek diplomacy was not possible. 
For relevant documents see Documents on International Af­
fairs 1954, ed. by D. Folliot, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1957, pp. 227-242. See also Stephen G. Xydis «Toward 
Toil and Moil in Cyprus,» The Middle East Journal, Voi. 20, 
no. 1 (Winter 1966), pp. 1-19, for events leading up to the 
outbreak of the anticolonial struggle in Cyprus.
1. On the EOKA struggle see Doros Alastos, Cyprus 
Guerilla : Grivas, Makarios and the British, London, Hei­
nemann, 1960 and Chailes Foley, Island in Revolt, London, 
Longmans, 1962. Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, Vol. II, pp. 
481-649 provides the most recent and synthetic account 
drawing on voluminous documentation.
2. For the theoretical foundation of these views cf. Karl 
W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Sostai Communication, Cam­
bridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press,1953. For a conceptualization of the 
political implications of socio-economic change, on which the 
previous discussion is based, see idem. «Social Mobilization 
and Political Development,» The American Political Science 
Review, yol. LV, no. 3, September 1961, pp. 493-514.
Against this background there emerged the con­
tention over the spoils of independence which was 
felt to be imminent once the British indicated their 
willingness to hand over the government of the island 
to the Cypriots themselves.3 Fortified in their antag­
onism by the support of their respective motherlands 
and by British colonial policy which as a rule discour­
aged ethnic integration in the territories of the Em­
pire,4 the two Cypriot ethnic communities found 
it increasingly difficult to compromise. Discord de­
veloped over both the form and the method of in­
dependence. The Greek Cypriots fought for union 
with Greece through the exercise of the right of self- 
determination. The Turkish Cypriots expressed in­
terest in continuing British rule or securing a parti­
tion of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey to be 
decided by these outside powers and Britain. The 
irreconcilability of these positions led to heighten­
ed tensions which exploded in violence. Thus tbe 
Workings of social mobilization and the political 
choices of the years 1945-1955 resulted in the trans­
lation of the traditional religious and linguistic dif­
ferences into ethnic conflict.
Accommodation or drastic surgical solutions were 
extremely difficult in view of the communal demog­
raphy and ethnic geography of Cyprus. As Table 
II indicates, the Turkish Cypriot community never 
exceeded twenty-five percent of the population. In-
TABLE II : Percentage Distribution of Population by Religion
at Census Years
Religion 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1946 1960
All Religions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Greek Orthodox 73.9 75.8 77.1 78.2 78.8 79.5 80.2 77.0 
Moslem (Turkish) 24.4 22.9 21.6 20.6 19.8 18.5 17.9 18.3 
Armenian—
Gregorian 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Roman-Catholic
1.1
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
0.7
0.2 0.8
Maronite 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Other 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.8
Source: Statistics and Research Dept., Ministry of Finance, STATIS­
TICAL ABSTRACT, 1970, No. 16, Nicosia: Printing Office 
of the Republic of Cyprus, 1970, p. 24.
3. On the precipitation of ethnic confitte by the approach 
of independence cf. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and 
Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, 1973, p. 22 : 
«... as soon as independence or foreign economic pressures 
make interdependence and pooling of scarce resources imper­
ative, institutional expressions of cultural separateness be­
come threats to stability, insteau of the assurances of social 
harmony they once were.»
4. See Adamantia Pollis, «Intergroup Conflict and British 
Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus,» Comparative Politics, 
Voi. 5, no. 4, July 1973, pp. 575-599. For the historical ori­
gins of this policy cf. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, 
Africa and the Victorians, Garden City, Doubleday, 1968,
pp. 10-11.
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deed, since the 1920s its numbers had dropped below 
twenty percent. Being thus an overwhelming majority 
of the population, the Greek Cypriots remained in­
transigent in their claim of self-determination by 
majority rule. Conversely, the extreme dispersion 
of Turkish Cypriot settlements all over the island, 
shown in Figure II, made it impossible to find a 
geographic basis for partition—a solution suggest­
ed first by the British and espoused by Turkey since 
the mid-1950s.1
The continuing anti-British guerilla struggle of the 
Greek Cypriots, the consequent endemic diplomatic 
confrontation between Britain, Greece and Turkey 
and mounting pressures from NATO and the world 
community, built up to such a point of tension that 
the parties to the conflict finally settled for a com­
promise: on August 16, 1960, following the Zurich 
and London agreements of the previous year and 
protracted negotiations in Cyprus thereafter, Cyprus 
emerged as an independent state.1 2
The Zurich and London agreements, concluded 
in February 1959, reflected the ethnic duality of 
Cyprus as well as the power balance of the contract­
ing parties. The British acquiesced to the loss of a 
colony, but secured rights to sizable sovereign bases 
on Cyprus. Further, in the confrontation between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it appears that the main­
land Greeks felt so pressed to reach a settlement that 
they gave up more than their fair share of bargaining
1. The escalation of conflict in the 1950s has stimulated 
voluminous writing on the Cyprus Question, including many 
accounts by journalists, official papers and many pamphlets 
explaining the respective viewpoints of those involved. The 
bibliography of primary sources in Crouzet, Le Conflit de 
Chypre, Vol. II, pp. 1155-1166, though incomplete is very 
useful. Robert Stephens, Cyprus'- A Place of Arms, London, 
Pall Mall, 1966 is a useful account by a distinguished journalist 
with great experience in the politics of the Eastern Mediter­
ranean. Important scholarly studies of this phase of the prob­
lem of Cyprus are, in addition to Crouzet, Stephen G. Xydis, 
Cyprus : Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958, Colombus, Ohio 
State University Press, 1967, Leontios Ierodiakonou, The 
Cyprus Question, Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1971, 
and Pantazis Terlexis, Διπλωματία καί Πολιτική του Κυπρια­
κού: ’Ανατομία ενός λάθους (Diplomacy and Politics of the 
Cyprus Question), Athens, Rappas, 1971. The most serious 
statement of the Turkish point of view is that by Suat Bilge, 
Le Conflit de Chypre et les Cypriotes Turcs, Ankara, Publi­
cations de la Faculté des Sciences Politiques de l’Université 
d’Ankara, 1961. Finally a valuable source of information, 
criticism and insights is Ch. Chrestides, Κυπριακό καί’Ελληνο­
τουρκικά: Πορεία μιας εθνικής χρεωκοπίας. (The Cyprus 
Question and Greek-Turkish Matters), Athens, 1967.
2. The pertinent documents appear in Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1958,
1959, (ed. by G. King), 1960 (ed. by R. Gott), London, Oxford 
University Press, 1962, 1963, 1964, pp. 376-395, 541-552, 
422-427, respectively. The complex diplomacy of the years
1958-60 leading up to the independence of Cyprus, is studied 
in great detail in Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus: Reluctant Repub­
lic, The Hague, Mouton, 1973.
chips to the Turkish side. The United States, being 
intimately involved with both Greece and Turkey, 
applied continuous pressure on both junior allies as 
well as on the Cypriots to settle amicably and to heal 
the «festering sore» in the southeastern flank of 
NATO.3
The Zurich and London agreements, and the Con­
stitution which was based on them, set up the Re­
public of Cyprus, which was given the status of 
sovereignty and independence and soon attained UN 
membership. However, on independence day Cyprus 
was bound by three treaties. The Treaty of Guarantee 
between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey (the 
three guarantors) was designed to safeguard the ter­
ritorial integrity and independence of Cyprus, si­
multaneously permitting the «guarantors» in concert 
or independently, to interfere in Cyprus to uphold 
the sfate of affairs created by the 1960 treaties and to 
prevent either Enosis, the Greek maximalist position, 
or Taksim (partition of the island between Greece and 
Turkey), the Turkish answer to Enosis. The Treaty of 
Alliance committed Greece and Turkey to come to 
the aid of Cyprus in case of external aggression 
and allowed them to station one military contingent 
each on Cyprus on a 60 /40 ratio. By the Treaty of 
Establishment Great Britain secured two sovereign 
base areas at Dhekelia and Akrotiri-Episkope in 
Southern Cyprus.4
The basic principles of the constitutional organi­
zation of the Republic of Cyprus were agreed upon 
at Zurich between the Prime Ministers of Greece 
and Turkey. During the subsequent London confer­
ence they were presented to the Cypriots to guide 
the work of the commission which Was to draft the 
Constitution of Cyprus. The Constitution took more 
than a year to draft and its major provisions were as 
follows: Cyprus would have a presidential regime with 
a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot 
Vice-President, each elected by his respective commu­
nity and each possessing final veto power on matters 
dealing with foreign affairs, defense and internal 
security. The Council of Ministers should include 
three Turkish Cypriots out of its ten members. At
3. For the impact of the Cyprus problem on the politics 
of Greece see Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reac­
tion to American and NATO Influences, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1966, pp. 93 ff. For Turkey, Frank Tachau, 
«The Face of Turkish Nationalism as reflected in the Cyprus 
Dispute,» The Middle East Journal, Vol. XIII. no. 3, Summer 
1959, pp. 262-272. For the British decision to relinquish sover­
eignty over: Cyprus see Naomi Rosenbaum, «Success in For­
eign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960,» Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, Voi. Ill, no. 4, December 1970, 
pp. 605-627.
4. For the text of the Treaties of Guarantee and Establish­
ment see United Nations Treaty Series, Voi. 382, 1960,pp.3-16. 
Several pages of Annexes to the Treaty of Establishment 
follow. The Treaty of Alliance appears ibid., voi. 397, 1961, 
pp. 287-295.
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least one of three important ministries (Defense, 
Foreign Affairs or Finance) should go to a Turkish 
Cypriot citizen. The Turkish Cypriots also secured 
quotas of 40 percent in the Army and the Security 
Forces and 30 percent in the Civil Service—well in 
excess of their 18 percent share in the population. 
The fifty-member legislature was to be composed of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot deputies on a 70 /30 ratio. 
Each ethnic community was to elect its deputies se­
parately. Separate majorities in each ethnic caucus 
were required to pass legislation on such matters as 
taxation, electoral procedures and the municipali­
ties. Exclusively communal affairs were to be adminis­
tered by the Greek and Turkish Communal Cham­
bers. Further there were provisions for separate 
Turkish and Greek municipalities, separate taxation 
and separate administration of justice. The Treaties 
of Guarantee and Alliance were annexed to the Con­
stitution. Article 182 of the Constitution declared 
the provisions of final veto, separate majorities and 
fixed ethnic ratios as well as the two incorporated 
treaties as basic and unalterable.1
It is obvious that this constitutional framework of 
the Republic of Cyprus was designed to contain and 
accommodate the ethnic conflict by satisfying some 
of the most basic requirements of the two Cypriot 
communities—e.g. by ruling out both union and par­
tition. Beyond this however the Cyprus constitution, 
premised on ethnic dualism, did not contribute any­
thing towards a substantive resolution of the past 
and potential intercommunal conflict. Its intricate 
formulas and cumbersome structures were precisely 
designed to freeze and perpetuate the ethnic divi­
sion. Instead of encouraging cooperation it institu­
tionalized separatist tendencies in its provisions for 
ethnic voting in parliament and split municipalities, 
Thus the public life of Cyprus was oriented by the very 
spirit of the constitution in the direction of ethnic 
antagonism instead of turning towards the demo­
cratic development of socially based party politics.
Constitutional experts everywhere concurred that 
the Cyprus constitution, despite its «ingenuity,» was 
practically unworkable.1 2 In real life efficient govern­
ment proved impossible and controversies quickly 
arose. The danger points centered on the question 
of the Army’s composition (i.e. at what level should 
the units be ethnically integrated), the passage of tax 
legislation, the establishment of separate munici­
1. The Cyprus Constitution is analyzed in Stanley Kyria- 
kides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 1968, pp. 
53-71.
2. Cf. the analysis and evaluation in S. A. de Smith, The
New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions, London, Stevens,
1964, pp. 282-296. Note the characteristic remark on p.
285 : «Constitutionalism has run riot in harness with commu- 
nalism.»
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palities and the implementation of the 70 /30 ratio 
in the composition of the civil service.3
Predictably the psychological dynamics of the post­
independence situation in Cyprus intensified these 
disagreements. The Greek Cypriots resented what 
they felt to be an unfair share of the bargain: although 
they had set aside their cherished aspiration for 
Enosis the final settlement gave them less than what 
the hard facts of their proportion in the population 
and their contribution to the economy would warrant. 
On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots were quite 
zealous in pressing for full enjoyment of their preroga­
tives under the Constitution, arguing that this was 
the only way to cope with the overwhelming numbers 
of the Greeks. Therefore the Turkish Cypriots re­
mained extremely suspicious of any suggestions 
of change in the status quo.
The outcome of all this was tension and escalating 
discord—to the point that by 1963 the Government 
could not collect taxes because the Turkish members 
of the House would not vote for the income tax bill— 
not out of any reservations regarding its fairness 
to their community, but as a tactical move to force 
the establishment of separate municipalities and the 
immediate implementation of the ethnic ratios pro­
vided by the Civil Service clauses of the Constitu­
tion.4
In November 1963, with this stalemate in the back­
ground, President Makarios offered for considera­
tion thirteen amendments designed to make the 1960 
Constitution workable.5 These amendments sought 
primarily to abolish the requirement for separate 
ethnic majorities in the legislature, to merge the sep­
arate judicial systems for the two communities and to 
eliminate the veto powers of the President and the 
Vice President. While the Turkish-Cypriot communiy 
was studying these proposals, Turkey immediately 
and flatly rejected them and admonished the Presi­
dent to respect the provisions of the externally guar­
anteed Cyprus Constitution.
In the ensuing climate of heightened tensions a small 
incident escalated into all-out violence between the two 
fired-up communities during the last week of Decem­
ber 1963. Turkey threatened to intervene militarily as 
the new year was dawning. Active American pressure
3. Kyriakides, op. cit., pp. 72-103.
4. Ibid·, pp. 85-86 for revealing views of Turkish Cypriot 
deputies.
5. The text of President Makarios’ thirteen proposed a- 
mendments appears in International Relations (Athens), Voi. 
II, no. 5, April 1964, pp. 8-24. Cf. Dimitri Bitsios, Κρίσιμες 
τΩρες, Athens, 1973, pp. 134-137 (English translation: Cyprus, 
Vulnerable Republic, Thessalonike, 1975, on the encouragement 
given to the Archbishop in this initiative by the then British 
High Commissioner in Cyprus.
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on all sides averted the escalation of the conflict into 
a Greek-Turkish war.1
The communal violence that erupted in 1963 and 
punctuated the following year, was a later and more 
intense phase of the ethnic conflict which emerged 
in the late 1950s. It not only underlined the fact that 
ethnic conflicts tend to be of long duration and to 
persist over time despite intervals of (usually) uneasy 
peace, but it also showed that the bicommunal ex­
periment conceived at Zurich and London primarily 
to meet NATO objectives, was ill founded and failed 
to contribute towards conflict resolution because it 
ignored the real issues and further distorted the rela­
tions of the two Cypriot communities by institution­
alizing external interference in the politics of Cyprus.
Following the crisis of Christmas 1963 the British 
intervened using troops stationed at their bases to 
reestablish order, separate the combatants and achieve 
a cessation of hostilities. It was at that time that the 
«Green Line» was drawn along a narrow street in the 
old city of Nicosia by the British military authorities. 
This line has since separated the Turkish quarter 
of Nicosia from the remainder of the city and has 
remained a symbol of ethnic division.
In the critical days following the British interven­
tion the initiative shifted to the old British metropo­
lis. London, with strong US backing, attempted to set 
up a multinational NATO emergency force whose 
task would be to police the tenuously established truce 
lines. Greece and Turkey reluctantly agreed with this 
proposal, but Archbishop Makarios—fearing par­
tition—staunchly opposed a NATO·generated «so­
lution» on Cyprus. After a conference in London 
between the three guarantor powers and represen­
tatives of the two Cypriot communities failed in 
February 1964, the Government of Cyprus brought 
the problem to the UN Secutity Council.
With its resolution of March 4, 1964 the Security 
Council called on all member states to refrain from 
actions that might endanger the territorial integrity 
and independence of Cyprus, urged restraint on all 
parties and recommended the establishment of an
1. For accounts of the 1963-64 crisis see Charles Foley, 
Legacy of Strife: Cyprus Form Rebellion to Civil War, Balti­
more, Penguin, 1964; Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms, 
pp. 168-191; Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism, etc., pp. 
104-134 which is based on detailed primary source documen­
tation; George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-Amer­
ican Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 105 ff, which brings the 
story up to the 1967 crisis. On US involvement in that crisis 
see Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink, 
New Yoik, Scribner, 1967, pp. 16-36. For relevant documents 
see American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964, De­
partment of State Publication 8253, Released August 1967, 
pp. 555-603.
international peace keeping force to be dispatched 
to Cyprus.2
The UN Cyprus Peace Keeping Force (UNFICYP) 
had as its primary purpose to interpose itself between 
the combatants after the cease fire and to act as an 
objective observer and facilitator of peaceful bargain­
ing. The size of UNFICYP has fluctuated from 6,400 
at its peak to about 2,400 at the time of this writing.
UNFICYP was s raffed primarily with contingents 
from Britain, Finland, Canada, Denmark, Ireland and 
Sweden. It has been divided into brigades, companies, 
squadrons and other units which are commanded by 
their national commanders, who, in turn, take their 
orders from UNFICYP’s commanding officer. The 
force was dispersed throughout the island, patrolling 
city streets and countryside, in order to discourage 
Jie accidental outbreak of local incidents. The UN 
Secretary General has been represented by a special 
envoy in Cyprus.
UNFICYP has been responsible to the UN Se­
curity Council, which authorizes and renews the 
Force’s life twice a year. However, most day-to-day 
authority over this Force has been delegated to the 
Secretary General. Its activities have included the 
following:
1. Pacification efforts (negotiation, mediation, 
good offices);
2. Civic action (i.e. to help the re-establishment 
of normal services and institutions);
3. Information gathering (to help in establishing a 
detached and accurate empirical base of facts which 
could facilitate negotiations).
In short, UNFICYP has been acting both as a 
buffer and a link between the two ethnic communities. 
UNFICYP’s mandate, however, has clearly excluded 
the «forceful imposition of peace» in Cyprus. So, 
whenever armed hostilities break out, the role of 
UNFICYP becomes more political-diplomatic and 
less military.
In the ten years of its operation between 1964-1974 
UNFICYP has performed quite admirably and has 
been welcome to all sides. The only criticism voiced 
occasionally argued that UNFICYP unwittingly con­
tributed to the freezing of the status quo (i.e. the 
de facto separation of the communities), and that 
its presence has become addictive for all the island­
ers who have grown psychologically dependent on 
this externally administered «pain killing» opera­
tion. In short, it could be said that UNFICYP man­
aged to control but not to eliminate ethnic conflict,
2. Text of the resolution in 19 United Nations Security 
Council Official Record, Supplement, January-March 1964, 
pp. 102-103, UN Doc. S/5575 (1964). For the appeal and 
the debates see 19 UN SCOR, Meetings 1094 to 1103 (17 
February to 13 March 1964).
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especially when the latter was exacerbated by external­
ly planned interventions in the political affairs of 
Cyprus.1
Since 1963-64 a stalemate developed between the two 
communities involving a de facto separation of Greek 
from Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot commu­
nity was insulated in enclaves scattered throughout the 
island. These enclaves have been primarily based on 
the Turkish quarters of the six major cities and on a 
number of clusters of Turkish villages in the country­
side. In the climate of tension and fear prevailing dur­
ing the ethnic confrontation in 1964, a number of small 
and isolated Turkish villages and the Turkish quarters 
of some mixed Greek and Turkish villages were a- 
bandoned by their population which moved to the 
areas that later were consolidated into the en­
claves.
Originally this movement appeared as the result 
of a quest for safety and refuge during the charged up 
atmosphere of hostilities. As time went by however 
and life was returning to its normal pace, especially 
after 1968, it became evident that the creation and 
sealing off of the enclaves was a measure designed to 
modify the ethnic demography of Cyprus and create 
at least a partial geographical basis for a political 
federation of the island, to replace the unitary state 
of the Republic of Cyprus.1 2 Documentary evidence 
that has been made available subsequently tends to 
corroborate this view.3 The Turkish Cypriot enclaves 
remained inaccessible to the government of Cyprus
1. Detailed accounts on the activities of the UNFICYP 
are provided in the reports submitted by the UN Secretary 
General to the Security Council every six months since 1964 
and published in the Supplements of the SCOR (usually in 
the June and December issues). An important contribution 
to the subiect is that by Michael Harbottle, The Impartial 
Soldier, London, Oxford University Press, 1970. Cf. also 
James Stegenga, «UN Peacekeeping: The Cyprus Venture,» 
Journal of Peace Research, Voi. 7, No. 1 (1970), pp. 1-15.
2. Cf. Kemal H. Karpat, «Solution in Cyprus: Federation,» 
The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace, New York, Insti­
tute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967, pp. 35-54. This essay 
expressing the Turkish view on Cyprus, states that the con­
centration of the Turkish Cypriot community in certain areas 
of the island following the 1963-64 breakdown, created the 
geographical basis for a cantonal federation. The author sug­
gests that four Turkish Cypriot and six-seven Greek Cypriot 
cantons could be formed and united in a federal structure 
which, he suggests, due to the special needs of Cyprus, ought 
to be tighter than that of Switzerland.
3. Cf. «Report of the Secretary General on the UN Ope­
ration in Cyprus,» Doc. S /6102, 12 December 1964, paragraph 
32, 19 UN SCOR, Supp. October-December 1964, pp. 230- 
231; «Report of the Secretary General on the UN Operation 
in Cyprus,» Doc. S /6228, 10 March 1965, paragraphs 53-56, 
20 UN SCOR, Supp. January-March 1905, pp. 118-119.
For the role of Turkey in all this cf. «Report of the Secre­
tary General on the UN Operation in Cuprus,» Doc. S /5764, 
June 15, 1964, paragraph 119, 19 UN SCOR, Supp. April- 
June 1964, pp. 239-40.
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and have been virtual no-go areas for Greek Cypriots. 
The Turks gradually developed separate administra­
tive structures (military, police, taxation and jus­
tice) within the enclaves and withdrew from partici­
pation in the Cypriot government which remained 
as the only internationally recognized authority in 
the island.4
It will be realized that the intensification of ethnic 
differentiation precipitated by the growth of Greek 
and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, and the ethnic 
violence of the 1950s prevented, once Cyprus at­
tained independence, an «integrative revolution» 
from taking off on the island.5 In the case of Cyprus 
the preconditions of some form of social, though pro­
bably not ethnic, integration were present in the socio­
logical substratum of traditional coexistence still 
surviving in the countryside. The institutionaliza­
tion of ethnic dualism however in the Cyprus consti­
tution and the consequent political climate of com­
munal divisiveness effectively blocked any policy 
initiatives which might have exploited the potential 
ities of social change in the direction of some form- 
of integrative evolution rather than foster conflict.
In addition a number of powerful exogenous factors 
also arrested the possible pattern of coexistence from 
developing. At the origins of the ethnically based po­
litical disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus lay 
the legacy of British colonial policy, which, as noted 
earlier, tended to solidify ethnic divisions by means 
of separate organization of communal groups in 
the colonial territoties.
An even more powerful factor have been the close 
linkages between the two Cypriot communities with 
Greece and Turkey respectively.
Since independence, and especially since the con­
stitutional breakdown of 1963-64 the inter-ethnic 
intransigence of both Cypriot communities had been 
considerably fortified by the policies of Greece and 
Turkey. Both countries, Turkey more effectively 
than Greece, have been dealing with their respective 
ethnic communities on Cyprus with scant regard to 
Cypriot sovereignty. Clearly support and directives 
emanating from Ankara to the Turkish Cypriot leader­
ship, have been a major factor in the creation of the 
enclaves and the promotion of the separation of the 
two Cypriot communities throughout the 1960s.e
4. The foreign diplomatic missions to Cyprus and UN 
officials continued to consult with the Turkish Cypriot leader­
ship. Dr. Kuchuk and after February 1973 Mr. Denktash 
were considered as the Vice President of the Republic.
5. Cf. Clifford Geertz, «The Integrative Revolution: Pri­
mordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,» Old 
Societies and New States, ed. by Clifford Geertz, New York, 
Free Press, 1963, pp. 105-157.
6. The Turkish insistence on the partition of Cyprus in 
the guise of geographical separation of the two communities,
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Support from Ankara also made possible the neutral­
ization of all moderate elements in the leadership of 
the Turkish Cypriots and the solidification of the 
separatist course advocated by the extremists. The 
escalation of extremism among Turkish Cypriot 
political elites in turn enabled Turkey to exercise 
total control and to maintain a firm grip over the en­
claves which remained dependent on economic aid 
and military protection from the mainland.1
Conversely, the vitality of the Cypriot economy and 
the effective political leadership of President Maka- 
rios combined to allow a considerable degree of in­
dependent initiative in the effort of the Cyprus gov­
ernment to secure the continuing independence of 
the island. The military dictatorship that came to 
power in Greece after the coup of April 21, 1967, 
however, had attempted systematically to quell the 
independent line of Archbishop Makarios by under­
mining his authority. The intra-ethnic conflict that 
developed among the Greek Cypriots as a consequen­
ce, complicated further all attempts at ethnic conflict 
management in Cyprus, to which we should now turn.
from legal arguments to attempts at 
conflict resolution: 1964-1974
During the ten years of ethnic crisis (1964-1974), 
both communities have advanced sets of well devel­
oped legal arguments designed to bolster their re­
spective positions while working substantively on the 
political level in order to crystalize a status quo con­
sonant with their interests.2 Archbishop Makarios, 
the unchallenged spokesman of the Greek Cypriot 
point of view, has followed the road of seeking a 
solution through direct negotiations between the 
communities, while making maximum use of the good 
offices of the UN General Assembly and minimizing, 
to the extent possible, influences from Greece, Tur­
key, Britain, the United State sand NATO ingenerai. 
President Makarios has consistently argued that the 
1960 Constitution and the treaties had been forced 
upon the Cypriot people and that these treaties have 
been blatantly inequitable.3 He feels that the pro­
visions of the Treaty Guarantee permitting the
was formally reiterated to the UN Mediator. See «Report 
of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary 
General,» Doc. S/6253, 26 March 1965, par. 73-75, 97-98, 
107-109, 20 UNSCOR, Supp. January-March 1965, pp. 199-253.
1. For details see A. Pollis, «Systemic Factors and the 
Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus,» pp. 31-34.
2. A very good recent study of the legal aspects of the 
disputes over Cyprus in their political context is Thomas 
Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1960, London, Oxford University Press, 
1974.
3. Cf. Xydis, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic, chapter XI, pp. 
420 ff for the reservations of Archbishop Makarios concerning 
the agreements and the pressures exerted on him by the Greek 
government.
intervention of third states (the guarantor powers) 
as well as the fact that amendment of the Constitu­
tion—on which the Cypriot people never had the 
opportunity to vote—is excluded in eternity, are 
clearly incompatible with internationally recognized 
principles of sovereignty and independence.4
On the political side the Greek case rests heavily 
on General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) of 
December 18, 1965 which takes «cognizance of the 
fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal member 
of the United Nations is, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy and 
should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete indepen­
dence without any foreign intervention or interfer- 
ence.»The Assembly has further called upon all nations, 
«in conformity with their obligations under the Char­
ter, and in particular Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, 
to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to 
refrain from any intervention directed against it.»5
Resting therefore its case on the international 
recognition of Cyprus5 sovereignty and evoking the 
generally acknowledged principle of majority rule 
and minority rights, the Cypriot government has 
offered consistently the following concessions in an 
attempt to reach compromise over this most thorny 
interethnic issue:
1. The adoption of a code of fundamental rights to 
protect the minority;
2. The requirement that the Turkish Cypriot partic­
ipation in Parliament should be on the basis of 
proportional representation to the population of 
the Cypriot Turks;
3. The authorization for the minority to direct the 
«education, culture, religion, and personal status 
of its members;»
4. The acceptance of a UN Commission which Would 
oversee the protection of minority rights for a 
specified period of time.6
The Turkish Cypriot position has also adopted 
a mixture of legal and political arguments in order 
to protect its interests. The Turkish Cypriots have 
accused President Makarios of failing to implement
4. For the full arguments of the Government of Cyprus 
concerning the Treaty of Guarantee cf. 19 UN SCOR, 109th 
Meeting (27 February 1964), pp. 15-21. Cf. also the Charter 
of the United Nations, Articles 2 (1), 2(4) and 103, all of which 
can be invoked against the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. 
This treaty also contravenes Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, remarkably, has 
been voted for by Turkey.
5. 20 UN General Assembly Official Records, 1402nd 
Plenary Meeting, 18 December 1965, pp. 2-11. The vote on 
this resolution was 47 for, 5 against, 54 abstaining. Text of 
Resolution 2077 in 20 UN GAOR, Annexes, Voi. Ill, p. 13.
6. Cf. Greek Cypriot official views as outlined in the «Re­
port by the UN Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General,» 
paragraphs 92-93.
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faithfully and equitably the 1960 Constitution from 
the very beginning. His Thirteen Amendments (No­
vember 1963) fly to the very face of Article 182 of the 
Cyprus Constitution which prohibits amendments. 
Beyond that, it is an accepted principle of internation­
al law that treaties are not subject to unilateral abro­
gation (pacta sunt servanda).1
The Turkish view continues by denouncing the 
Greek Cypriot majority’s policies of «exclusion and 
oppression» which have allegedly been designed 
to drive the Turkish minority from the island. Thus, 
the Turkish Cypriots purported to justify their stern 
resistance and the support they are securing from 
mainland Turkey on the foundation of Article 4 
of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) which states :
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present 
treaty, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake 
to consult together with respect to the representations or 
measures necessary to ensure observance of those provi­
sions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove pos­
sible, each of the three quaranteeing powers reserves the 
right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the 
state of affairs created by the present Treaty.1 2
In short the Turkish view initially was that the Zu­
rich and London treaties and the 1960 Constitution 
remained valid and, as a minimum for a settlement, 
the parties involved should return to the status quo 
ante (1963). These remained the positions of the two 
communities during the period 1964-1974.
While the conflict has been simmering during 
the past ten yers, reaching on occasion (twice in 
1964 and once in 1967) peak levels threatening a 
simultaneous Turkish and Greek intervention in 
Cyprus which could escalate into a full-scale war 
between the two countries,3 efforts have been made 
to solve the Cyprus problem on at least four levels : 
a) international; b) regional; c) sub-regional; and d) 
local. Basically these four levels could be more simply 
divided in two : a) solutions imposed on the Cyp­
riots by outside powers versus b) solutions arrived at 
by intercommunal negotiations between those di­
rectly involved by virtue of being the inhabitants 
of Cyprus.
On the international level of conflict management 
and resolution efforts the major focus should be
1. For a fuller statement of Turkish arguments see 19 
UN SCOR 1045th Meeting, (18th February 1964), pp. 34-40.
2. UN Treaty Series, Voi. 382, p. 6
3. The unfolding of the conflict in the 1960s has not yet
formed the object of scholarly studies comparable to those 
that analyze events in the 1950s. For general surveys see Iero- 
diakonou, The Cyprus Question, op. cit., pp. 249-300; Kyria- 
kides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism, etc., op. cit., pp. 135-170; 
Linda B. Miller, Cyprus, The Law and Politics of Civil Strife,
Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Center for Interna­
tional Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
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on the activities and initiatives of the United Nations 
in the Cyprus question. During the 1950s, while the 
struggle for decolonization was going on in Cyprus, 
Greece and the Greek Cypriots chose the UN as 
an instrument of policy. Although excluded from the 
process that brought about the Zurich and London 
agreements, the UN has proved a useful echo cham­
ber and world public opinion forum generating some 
serious pressures upon the British to relinquish 
colonial control over the island. The role of the UN 
in the 1960s, the post-independence period for Cy­
prus, has been considerably more active and deci­
sive than in the 1950s largely because the government 
of Cyprus placed more trust in the mediating efforts 
of the international organization, insisting that the 
Cyprus problem was not a Greek-Turkish dispute 
to be resolved by NATO.4 We have already spoken 
about UNFICYP.
Further, the UN Secretary Generals, through 
their official mediators Sakari S. Tuomioja of Fin­
land and Dr. Gaio Plaza of Ecuador tried to pro­
mote a policy of peaceful coexistence and engage­
ment between the two communities while recognizing 
the unitary nature of the Cypriot state and recom­
mending as the most likely path to a permanent 
solution direct negotiations between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, with the encouragement (but not 
intervention) of all outside interested parties. In 
this question particular mention should be made of 
the Report on the mediating activities submitted by 
Dr. Gaio Plaza to the Secretary General in March 
1965.5 This is a document of highly enlightened 
statesmanship which with its suggestions of political 
formulas and structural arrangements and its per­
vading concern for human welfare, could be an inva­
luable basis of all resolution efforts. The Report, 
counceling against persistence in the pursuit of 
union or partition and recommending ample safe­
guards of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in a 
unitary state, was accepted by the government of 
Cyprus but rejected by the government of Turkey 
and consequently by the leadership of the Turkish 
Cypriot community.
So, to summarize, the approach of the interna­
tional factor has been to leave the solution of the 
problem to the Cypriots alone and to provide good 
offices and other mediating and facilitative services 
from the outside while discouraging great power
4. The involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus 
problem and the discussion of the issue in the Security 
Council and General Assembly repeatedly since 1964 is covered 
regularly in successive volumes of the UN Monthly Chronicle.
5. For full citation see note 6 of p. 282.For the substantive 
proposals of the Mediator note in particular paragraphs 
132-148 on the issues of independence, self-determination and 
international peace; 149-157 on the structure of the state and 
158-165 on the protection of the individual and minority rights.
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(US, USSR) and middle power (Great Britain, Greece 
and Turkey) intervention in the internal affairs of 
the island.
On the regional level, efforts to solve the Cyprus 
problem have tended to follow the very direction 
that the government of Cyprus had constantly tried 
to avoid. The predominant element on this level 
has been the efforts of Britain and the United States 
through NATO to eliminate the last remaining 
casus belli in the affairs of Greece and Turkey, regard­
less of what this might mean for the fate of Cyprus.1 
As we indicated above, between December 1963 and 
February 1964 Britain attempted to organize a NATO 
regional force to supervise the truce in Cyprus.2 This 
would have involved a three-month renewable NATO- 
recruited and British-commanded multinational force 
of 10,000 men which would have been placed under 
the political guidance of a committee of NATO 
ambassadors. Negotiations would have been en­
hanced through the efforts of an appointed mediator 
from a NATO country, other than Greece, Turkey, 
Great Britain and the United States. Turkey and 
Greece assented to this plan with some important 
qualifications. President Makarios, however, objected 
and asked instead for a force which would have been 
responsible to the UN rather than NATO. This, 
of cource, was in keeping with the Cypriot policy 
of strategic non-alignment and active participation 
in the Third World movement.
The NATO level activities assumed a far more 
aggressive and interventionist nature under the ini­
tiative of the United States. In July of 1964 President 
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed the veteran diplomat 
Dean Acheson as a special mediator for Cyprus. 
Acheson’s view was that the problem should be solved 
by direct agreement of Greece and Turkey within 
the spirit of the NATO alliance. This meant that the 
Cypriots, above all Archbishop Makarios, need not 
and should not necessarily be consulted. In the last 
analysis, a solution would have to be imposed upon 
the two warring Cypriot communities. Specifically, 
the plan woven by the aging diplomat would have 
taken the outward form of Enosis of Cyprus with 
Greece, and by extension, assured entry of Cyprus 
into the NATO complex. The Turkish side, however, 
would have been pacified with territorial concessions 
in the form of a sizable sovereign or leased base, 
extensive guarantees for the Turkish minority and 
the development of Turkish cantons in the Greek- 
controlled portion of Cyprus.3
1. The involvement of NATO in the 1963-64 crisis is 
assessed in Philip Windsor, «NATO and the Cyprus Crisis,» 
Adelphi Papers, no. 14, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, 
1964.
2. For the relevant documents cf. American Foreign Po­
licy Current Documents 1964, pp. 556-557.
3. For an official US assessment of the Cyprus problem
The Greek and Turkish governments initially ac­
cepted, in principle and quite cautiously, the Acheson 
proposals. President Makarios, however, denounced 
the plan as a barely disguised form of partition of 
Cyprus which was totally unacceptable to the inter­
ests of the Greek Cypriot population. Despite dif­
ficult odds and unbearable pressures upon the Arch­
bishop, his views somehow managed to withstand 
the regional /strategic pressures orchestrated by the 
United States in the framework of the NATO alliance.
Perhaps the most important dimension added by 
the US to the Cyprus imbroglio has been in the 
US's restraining influence over Greece and Turkey 
to avoid an outbreak of war between them. For 
example, the US through a series of emmissaries 
and mediators, has continuously counseled prudence 
and urged a negotiated settlement to be reached be­
tween Greece and Turkey. George Ball’s trip to Cy­
prus in February 1964, Lyndon Johnson’s telegram 
to Premier Inonu in July 1964 strongly counseling 
against Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Dean Ache- 
son’s mediating efforts in July 1964, and Cyrus 
Vance’s frenzied activity in November of 1967, all 
illustrate this type of activity. A major departure 
from this style has been Secretary Henry Kissinger’s 
orchestrated apathy vis-à-vis the bloody events 
of July-August 1974 in Cyprus.
The sub-regional level focuses on the efforts of 
Greece and Turkey to safeguard their national inter­
ests in Cyprus. Whether one speaks of the pre- or 
post-independence period of Cyprus (i.e. before and 
after 1960), it would be a safe assumption to make 
that both Greece and Turkey have placed their own 
general security requirements, and by extension their 
NATO obligations, as well as their domestic polit­
ical exigencies on a higher priority than any con­
cern they might have had with the welfare of their 
ethnic brothers in Cyprus.
As we have already pointed out, both Greece and 
Turkey have attempted to penetrate and control their 
respective ethnic counterparts in Cyprus, perceiving 
the two Cypriot communities as clients or, more 
euphemistically, junior partners. Naturally, Turkey 
has found it much easier to control the utterly de­
pendent and economically depressed Turkish en­
claves. On the contrary, President Makarios and 
the Cypriot government have proven a harder nut 
to crack, to the point that, particularly in the post- 
1967 period, one could say that the controlling in­
fluence of the Athens government was considerably
see George Ball, «The Responsibilities of a Global Power,» 
Department of State Bulletin, Voi. 51, 1964, pp. 476-477. For 
Acheson’s own account of his activities see Dean Acheson, 
«Cyprus: The Anatomy of the Problem,» Chicago Bar Record, 
Vol. XLVI, no. 8, May 1965, pp. 349-356. For details about 
the provisions of the Acheson plan see Tò Βήμα, Athens, 
September 1, 1964, p. 1.
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weakened in Nicosia. This was made abundantly clear 
in February 1972, when President Makarios ignored 
a public ultimatum from Athens to drastically re­
structure his government or resign. He did neither 
and survived.1
It was thus becoming increasingly clear that in 
view of the Cypriots’ resistance—which was eloquently 
expressed in the overwhelming popular support en­
joyed by President Makarios— as well as because of 
the objections voiced by the Soviet Union, NATO 
could not impose an Acheson type of solution, short 
of using drastic military means. This created the 
political preconditions of a negotiated settlement to 
be reached through inter-communal talks, presum­
ably premised primarily not on foreign strategic 
interests but on considerations over the welfare and 
interests of the Cypriots themselves.
This leads us to the local level of settlement efforts 
through direct negotiations of the two Cypriot com­
munities. Thus We come full circle since the objectives 
and methods of conflict resolution encouraged on 
the international level have been essentially the same 
as the strategy of the intercommunal talks. Nego­
tiations were initiated in June 1968 and continued 
in several phases until mid-1974 between Messers 
derides and Denktash representing the two ethnic 
communities. At a later stage two constitutional 
experts from Greece and Turkey were included to 
assist the two principal negotiators. The special 
representative of the UN General Secretary in 
Cyprus, attended as well.
The discussions covered many of the constitutional 
problems raised by the ethnic conflict and although 
the content of the negotiations remained secret, in­
formed sources repeatedly intimated that significant 
progress was being made. At the later stages of 
the talks substantive disagreement was narrowed down 
over the issue of local government—the Greek side 
conceding that considerable decentralization was de­
sirable but also insisting that the jurisdiction and 
functions of local government should not be such 
as to create essentially the infrastructure of a com­
munal Turkish state within the unitary state of Cy­
prus. 1 2
We believe that the intercommunal negotiations 
were the appropriate method of conflict resolution
1. For an excellent analysis of the relations between the 
governments of Greece and Cyprus in the period 1960-1972 
see the essay by Alexander G. Xydis, «Tò Ψυχολογικό Πλέ­
γμα» (The Psychological Complex), in A.G. Xydis, Sp. Linar- 
datos, K. Chadjiargyris, Ό Μακάριος καί οί Σύμμαχοί του 
(Makarios and his Allies), Athens, Gutenberg, 1972, pp. 11-40.
2. Cf. C.A. Theodoulou, «Quelques aspects de la crise
chypriote actuelle», Politique Etrangère, Vol. 37, no. 2, 1972,
pp. 221-233. Agreement was repeatedly reported as being very 
close at hand, but in all those occasions the following pattern 
would recur on the behavior of the Turkish side: the Turkish
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because they provided a channel of direct communi­
cation between spokesmen of the two ethnic Cypriot 
communities. In such a context misperceptions and 
misconceptions could be discussed and cleared up, 
common interests realized and the bases of agree­
ment identified, if only good would prevail.3 The 
preconditions of a successful strategy of conflict 
resolution were indeed present in Cyprus and should 
have been apparent to any perceptive observer of 
the situation in the island during the past several 
years, despite the muted confrontation of the two 
communities.
To begin with there was the sociological basis of 
interethnic coexistence and cooperation which had 
not just been historically the feature of life in Cyp­
riot traditional society but had survived largely 
intact in the ethnically mixed communities of rural 
Cyprus. The constructive record of the UNFICYP 
in conflict containment, added another useful pre­
condition of conflict resolution. The UNFICYP could 
be used as an impartial police force to provide the 
necessary protection and security to all Cypriots 
once all other armed forces were removed from the 
scene. If the Greek and Turkish contingents and 
military personnel Were removed from Cyprus and 
the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighting 
units were disbanded, not only the probability of 
recurrent collisions and explosions would be effec­
tively checked, but also considerable funds would 
be economized to finance the stationing of a neutral 
and periodically rotating international force on a semi­
permanent basis in Cyprus to act as an arbitrator and 
observer of the would-be settlement.4 We think 
that such a situation would guarantee effectively the
Cypriot negotiator would fly to Ankara to brief the Turkish 
government on the progress of the talks. Upon his return to 
Cyprus however the Turkish views would be invariably an­
nounced as hardened and the previous points of agreement 
discarded. This systematic subversion of all agreements reached 
in intra-Cypriot negotiations by Ankara, was last manifested 
in the rejection of an agreement over the operation of Nicosia 
International Airport, after the abortive resumption of talks 
in January 1975. See The New York Times, January 24, 1975, 
p. 3, and Ibid., February 1, 1975, p. 2.
3. For the social psychological dynamics of such situations 
and the importance of direct communication for the resolu­
tion of conflict see John W. Burton, Conflict and Communi­
cations·: The Use of Controlled Communication in International 
Relations, London, Macmillan, 1969. Cf. Herbert C. Kelman’s 
evaluation of this work «The Problem-Solving Workshop in 
Conflict Resolution,» in Communication in International 
Politics, ed. by Richard L. Merritt, University of Illinois 
Press, 1972, pp. 168-204. For an argument that by the late 
1960s the Cyprus conflict was becoming a problem of misper­
ception cf. John W. Burton, World Society, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1972, pp. 55-59, 68-69, 75-77.
4. It should be added here that the government of Cyprus 
had repeatedly argued for demilitarization of the island in 
the context of a settlement. See for instance the «Report of 
the UN Mediator,» paragraph 92.
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security of the Turkish Cypriots so that they could 
feel free and safe to come out of the self-imposed 
seclusion of the enclaves and participate in the life 
of Cyprus. By guaranteeing peace and security there­
fore a permanent Cyprus UN police force could 
help create both the practical mechanisms and the 
psychological climate of ethnic reintegration.
But most important of all the new directions 
emerging in the political life of Cyprus and the dynam­
ics of economic development seemed to be working 
in favor of an accommodation of the conflict. Politically 
the growth of moderation and realism had led to the 
conclusion that the pursuit of independent statehood 
was the safest course for Cyprus. This became offi­
cial policy when in 1965 the government of Cyprus 
formally accepted the recommendations of UN Me­
diator Dr. Gaio Plaza who explicitly counseled against 
persisting in the pursuit of Enosis. In repeated de­
mocratic elections the Greek Cypriot community had 
confirmed this policy by casting overwhelmingly their 
votes in support of Archbishop Makarios and his 
supporters and the «feasible» solution (i.e. indepen­
dence) they advocated. This meant that the most fun­
damental and uncompromising demand of the Tur­
kish Cypriots was met and consequently the way for 
an accommodation should have been open. Another 
hopeful indication in this direction was the emergence 
of socially based political parties which could con­
ceivably cut into the ethnic cleavage as earlier in­
stances of interethnic cooperation in trade unions or 
in the cause of Cypriot independence might suggest.1
Economically the fast rate of growth and indus­
trial expansion1 2 had broadened the labor market 
and thus Turkish Cypriot workers who were kept 
secluded and idle in the enclaves could join the labor 
force and thus be economically reintegrated in Cyp­
riot society as they had been in the past. Normal 
contacts could be resumed in all commercial and 
industrial areas once the separatist policy «from 
Turk to Turk» pressed on the Turkish Cypriots by 
their leaders, was modified or dropped. The econom­
1. The emergence of political parties and electoral poli­
tics in their social context are examined in Paschalis M. Ki- 
tromilides, Patterns of Politics in Cyprus, unpublished thesis, 
Wesleyan University, 1972. Cf. Peter Loizos, The Greek Gift: 
Politics in a Cypriot Village, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975, pp. 235-88.
2. The best sources on economic planning and development 
in Cyprus are The second Fixe Year Plan, 1967-1971 and
The Third Five Year Plan, 1972-1976, both prepared by the 
Planning Bureau of the Republic of Cyprus and containing 
all the relevant statistical information on achievements, targets 
and problems in the economic development of Cyprus. The 
performance of Cyprus can be best appreciated in a compara­
tive perspective as presented in the special report on economic 
development published in The UNESCO Courier, February
1970 (23rd year), pp. 22-3: in a survey of 69 developing countries 
Cyprus is classified in the category of those with both the highest 
growth rate and per capita income in the decade of the 1960s.
ic reintegration of Cypriot society might also pro­
vide the means of redressing the inequalities in 
the levels of economic development of the two com­
munities, thus removing one of the underlying struc­
tural sources of conflict.3 Indeed by the early 
1970s increasing numbers of Turkish Cypriot work­
ers were employed in projects of public works and 
general economic exchanges tended to be resumed 
between the two communities. Normal economic re­
lations had never of course been severed in the 
agrarian economy of mixed rural communities.
With these trends in mind it is plausible to argue 
that the social and political context was ripe for a 
commonly acceptable Constitutional formula satis­
fying the basic needs and long standing objections 
of both sides and setting up the institutional frame­
work of effective conflict resolution and social reinte­
gration. To meet these requirements a viable model 
for Cyprus would have to be based on independence 
by ruling out all forms of union and partition. The 
institutional set-up should be premised on decen­
tralization to allow ethnic autonomy and sharing 
in the central institutions of power to secure the inte­
grated character of the state. The constitutional 
infrastructure of reintegration could be established if 
a number of divisive provisions of the 1960 Con­
stitution were amended. For instance the Greek Pres­
ident and the Turkish Vice President would have 
to be elected by the entire population of the island. 
The representation of the Turkish side in Parliament, 
the bureaucracy and the security forces would have 
to be analogous to the percentage of Turkish popu­
lation (18 %) rather than ranging up to 30 or 40 per­
cent. On the other hand considerable autonomy and 
self-management would have to be recognized to the 
Turkish communities of the island in conducting 
their local and broadly cultural affairs (religion, edu­
cation, etc.) to reassure them in their desire to pre­
serve their highly valued ethnic identity.4 Interna­
tional guarantees could have been adopted to oversee 
and secure the effective operation of this autonomy. 
The Parliament however would have to be divided 
into Greek and Turkish caucuses voting separately 
only on residual matters dealing exclusively with
3. Cf. Stathis Panagides, «Communal Conflict and Economic 
Considerations: TheCaseofCyprus,» JournalofPeaceResearch, 
Voi. 5, 1968, pp. 133-145.
4. According to the 1960 Constitution such matters were 
to be administered by the Communal Chambers. See Consti­
tution of Cyprus, Part V, Articles 86-111, in A.J. Peaslee, ed., 
Constitutions of Nations, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1968, Voi. Ill, 
Europe, pp. 170-178. In his 13 ammendments in 1963 Presi­
dent Makarios proposed the abolition of the Greek Communal 
Chamber and the delegation of its functions to a Ministry of 
Education for reasons of increased governmental efficiency. 
He stated however that the Turkish Cypriot community was 
free to retain its Communal Chamber.
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intra-community affairs. The experience of 1960-63 
had amply demonstrated that the entire Parliament 
would have to vote as a cohesive unit, abolishing 
the requirement of securing separate majorities of 
each ethnic caucus on all important legislation.
This was not an inconceivable way in which events 
could have developed and Cyprus might have become 
a model case of a fair resolution of ethnic conflict. 
Unfortunately the positive trends outlined above, 
were not allowed to come to fruition. Ethnic dualism 
has not been the only or even the primary cause of 
conflict in Cyprus. The dynamics of conflict reso­
lution were effectively blocked by outside interfer­
ence. Thus every time the intercommunal talks seem­
ed to reach a point of substantial agreement on 
fundamental issues, the trend was reversed by behind 
the scenes manipulation of the Turkish Cypriot 
negotiator by the Turkish government in Ankara.1 
Writing with events since July 1974 in mind, we 
can assert with considerable certainty that despite 
its grudging endorsement of the interethnic negotia­
tions, Turkish policy never abandoned the pursuit 
of partition which was first suggested by Britain in 
the 1950s and was later presented as the official 
Turkish view on Cyprus to the UN Mediator in 
1965.1 2 In the background of this posture was the 
fact that manipulation of the Cyprus issue in Turkish 
internal politics had proved a convenient diversion 
of attention from pressing domestic problems.3
In the pursuit of this aim Turkey was fortified by 
US policy which has favored some form of partition 
of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey—thus achieving 
both the eradication of a cause of conflict threatening 
the solidity of the southeastern flank of NATO and 
the incorporation of Cyprus, a territory with some 
strategic value,4 *within the boundaries of two mem­
1. See note 2 of page 286.
2. Cf. note 6 of page 282. For an informative survey of the 
views of the various political parties of Turkey on Cyprus 
see Ferenc Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus'. The Foreign 
Policy of Turkey, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 
78-99.
3. Cf. Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 188. For the 
manipulation of the public’s sensitivity over Cyprus in Turkish 
domestic politics, cf. Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus, pp. 
99-114,358-364.
4. The following view is revealing as to how Cyprus is
perceived in certain American quarters: «As a center of ope­
rations directed toward the Soviet bloc-presuming over-flight 
rights with Turkey-Cyprus has great potential. Moscow is only
1500 air miles from Cyprus airstrips; Baku, the Soviet oil 
center on the Caspian Sea, lies only 1000 miles away; Rostov, 
a main industrial center on the Don River is 900 miles distant; 
Sverdlovsk, a center of Soviet heavy industry, is situated at a 
distance of 2000 miles, and the oil fields of Rumania are as 
near as 800 miles. In fact, Batum, the nearest point in the 
Soviet Union from Cyprus is only 830 miles away and the 
nearest city in the Soviet bloc, the Bulgarian city of Akhtopol,
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bers of the Western alliance. The disappearance of 
Cyprus as a sovereign Republic would also terminate 
the independent and neutralist outlook in the foreign 
policy of President Makarios—a policy resented by 
the Cold-Warriors in Washington. This is adequately 
indicated, we think, by US insistence on a settlement 
of Cyprus within NATO in the 1950s, by the Acheson 
plans promoted during the crisis of the mid-1960s 
and finally by American acquiescence in if not support 
for the Turkish invasion and violent partition of 
Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Probably the most 
eloquent indication of American attitudes on the prob­
lem of Cyprus is offered by the vote the USA cast 
against the innocuous resolution affirming the in­
dependence and sovereignty of Cyprus, passed by 
the UN General Assembly in December 1965.® 
Greece also was converted to the line of some form 
of NATO oriented partition, once the military 
dictatorship rose to power in 1967.6 The Athens 
colonels felt that some territorial concessions to 
Turkey would be desirable in order to satisfy the ata­
vistic aspirations of Greek irredentist nationalism. 
Apparently such a foreign maneuver was expected 
to generate some popular sympathy for the repressive 
military regime. Hence the encouragement and direc-
is a mere 550 air miles. Cyprus thus occupies a peculiarly stra­
tegic location as an air base.» T. W. Adams, AKEL: The Com­
munist Party of Cyprus, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press,
1971, p. 87.
5. The study of US policy toward Cyprus has been placed 
on an entirely new basis by the research of Van Coufoudakis 
who has presented convincing arguments and documentation 
supporting a view of a continuity of American policy since 
the 1950s in pursuit of the partition of Cyprus as the ideal 
solution from the vantage point of Americani interests. See 
Van Coufoudakis, «United States Foreign Policy and the Cy­
prus Question: A case Sludy in Cold War Diplomacy,» in 
Couloumbis and Hicks, eds., US Foreign Policy toward 
Greece and Cyprus, pp. 106-138.
6. More correctly it can be said that Greece agreed to coo­
perate in undermining the independence of Cyprus already 
under the governments that came to power after the fall of 
the Papandreou government in 1965. For an incisive ciitique 
see Ch. Chrestides, Κυπριακό καί Ελληνοτουρκικά (The 
Cyprus Question, etc.), pp. IX-CXX1I and idem.f Ακρως Απόρ­
ρητον: Tò Πρωτόκολλο της 17ης Δεκεμβρίου 1966 (Top 
Secret: The Protocol of 17 December 1966), Athens, 1973.
On the policy of the Greek military junta toward Cyprus 
see Alexander G. Xydis, «The Military Regime’s Foreign 
Policy,» Greece under Military Rule, ed. by Richard 
Clogg and George Yannopoulos, New York, Basic Books,
1972, pp. 191-209.
A strand of radical opinion tends to attribute the advent 
of the military dictatorshin in Greece to the increasing 
urgency felt by NATO and the USA to quell the inde­
pendent stands taken by the Papandreou government in 
opposing the partition of Cyprus. Cf. Andreas Papandreou, 
Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, Garden City,
Doubleday, 1970, pp. 129-141, and Constantine Tsoucalas, 
The Greek Tragedy, London, Penguin, 1969, pp. 153-165, 
189-191.
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tion of the several moves to unseat President Maka- 
rios.
The pattern of intra-ethnic discord that the Greek 
military regime encouraged in the ranks of the Greek 
Cypriot community escalated in the formation of 
extremist underground armed groups like the Na­
tional Front (1969-1970) and EOKA-B (1971-74) 
which preached a revival of the Enosis movement.1 
These developments in turn exacerbated the fears 
of the Turkish Cypriots and undermined further the 
efforts at an accommodation of ethnic differences. 
Deprived of popular sympathy these campaigns 
of extreme right wing subversion and terrorism failed 
to unseat President Makarios who won reelection 
for a third term in 1973. Several documents captured 
during police operations against EOKA-B terrorism, 
clearly implicated the Greek junta and Greek officers 
serving in Cyprus. In a now famous letter to the fig­
urehead President of dictatorial Greece, Archbi­
shop Makarios expressed his abhorrence for mili­
tary regimes and demanded the termination of the 
disastrous activities of the junta in Cyprus. Aspolit­
icai oppression and bankruptcy were reaching their 
climax in Greece, the junta responded by engineering 
the coup of July, 15, 1974. This coup and the subse­
quent Turkish invasion have left Cyprus in the trag­
ic condition which we described at the beginning 
of this paper.1 2
From the point of view of the future of the eth­
nic conflict the most momentous effect of the Turkish 
invasion, is the forceful demographic change im­
posed on the occupied areas of Northern Cyprus. 
This consists of a policy of moving Turkish set­
tlers (either infiltrators from the South or colonists 
from Asia Minor) into Greek villages and towns
1. For the sociological character and social bases of this 
movement see Peter Loizos, «The progress of Greek nation­
alism in Cyprus, 1878-1970,» in J. Davis, ed , Choise and 
Change: essays in honour of Lucy Mair, LSE monographs 
on Social Anthropology, no. 50, 1974, pp. 114-133 and Kyriacos 
Markides, «Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social 
Movements: The Case of Cyprus,» American Ethnologist, Voi. 
I, no. 2, May 1974, pp. 304-330.
2. The fullest account of these developments yet available 
is that by Laurence Stern «Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in 
Cyprus,» Foreign Policy, no. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 34-78. 
On the domestic processes leading up to the crisis see K.C.
Markides, «Internal Weaknes and External Intervention: The 
Collapse of the Cyprus Republic», Paper presented at the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, May 1975. 
An incisive forecast of the tragedy is Ch. Chresdes, 'Η Αύτο- 
καταστροφή τών 'Ελληνοκυπρίων (The Self-Destruction of the 
Greek Cypriots), Athens 1973. Idem■ 'Από τον ‘Ιούλιο 1974 
εκλεισε χρόνος (A year has been completed since July 1974), 
Athens 1975 and Ploutes Servas, 'll Κυπριακή Τραγωδία (The 
Cyprus Tragedy), Athens 1975 offer critical analyses of the 
problem and its handling by the governments of Greece and 
Cyprus.
to occupy the properties of refugee Greek Cypriots.3 
This process of forceful demographic transformation 
is placed in its proper symbolic context by turkicizing 
place names, by destroying monuments of Greek cul­
ture, by turning Orthodox churches into mosques 
and by erecting statues of Kemal Ataturk in the oc­
cupied areas. We can not forecast what the precise 
outcome of all this is going to be but there can 
be no doubt that it will have a powerful impact on the 
future pattern of inter-ethnic relations in Cyprus 
and elsewhere.
epilogue
Whenever Cyprus captured the attention of stu­
dents of politics it did so as an international prob­
lem, an element in strategy and power relations in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. What has come to be known 
as the Cyprus Question, essentially a leftover of the 
Eastern Question of old, has fundamentally involved 
the issue of control over a strategically located is­
land at the threshold of the Near East. In this paper 
we have tried to shift focus from the international 
to the domestic aspect of conflict over Cyprus by 
considering the emergence and unfolding of the ethnic 
dispute which has dominated the politics of the is­
land for many years. (For the benefit of those read­
ers who are interested in the international aspects 
of the problem of Cyprus, we have included all the 
relevant literature in the references.)
From a theoretical point of view we have tried to 
point at the relation between the workings of social 
change and the evolution of the ethnic conflict. The 
most significant finding in this connection seems 
to have been the fact that despite the effort to con­
centrate on domestic social and political processes, 
it is ultimately impossible to consider the nature 
of ethnic conflict in Cyprus without discussing in­
ternational politics—especially at all those points 
when instability and strife escalate in the island. 
This points at the close linkages between the politics 
of inter- and intra-ethnic conflict in Cyprus with 
international power politics in the area. Instability 
in Cyprus tends to be telescoped and engulf the polit­
ics and foreign relations of Greece and Turkey, 
and through the 1950s and early 1960s British im­
perial policy in the Middle East as well. All this in 
turn affects the international equilibrium in a 
sensitive and fragile geopolitical region. Conversely, 
conflict and instability in Cyprus are influenced, and 
domestic developments are often distorted by the
3. The New York Times, November 2, 1974, pp. 1,7; ibid, 
January 17, 1975, p. 8; ibid., February 10, 1975, p. 10 and 
ibid., July 3,1975, p. 2. On the pressures on the Greek Cypriots 
to leave the occupied area see The Manchester Guardian 
Weekly, March 1, 1975.
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attempts of outside powers to shape the political 
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in their own 
interest. Thus through a variety of social and political 
processes internal conflict in Cyprus is internation­
alized and therefore its outcome becomes dependent 
upon external factors.1
Throughout this paper it ought to have been clear 
that external sources contributed greatly to the stim­
ulation and exacerbation of conflict within Cyprus. 
At the initial stages British colonial policy and the 
nationalist influences emanating from Greece and 
Turkey provided the context and the momentum need­
ed for the escalation of ethnic strife. Later on, Cold 
War American policies advanced through NATO 
nurtured the conflict indirectly first and more di­
rectly in the recent past (early 1970s)1 2 in order to 
achieve the partition and NATOization of Cyprus. 
In this phase both Greece and Turkey became— 
willingly and consciously—the channels through which 
systemic NATO pressures were exercised on Cyprus, 
a non-member of the alliance. The close historical, 
national and social ties of the island with these two 
countries ultimately provided the most effective con­
duits to those who knew how to manipulate these in­
timate ethnic bonds in order to undermine and sub­
vert the Republic of Cyprus. The contribution that 
the experience of Cyprus has therefore to make to 
the comparative study of ethnic conflict concerns 
primarily the importance of exogenous sources in the 
creation and intensification of communal antag­
onism.
Still the force of this claim rests significantly on the 
evidence that one can adduce in support of an ar­
gument that in the absence of outside pressures 
ethnic conflict could have been regulated in the 
context of democratic coexistence and elimination 
of violent confrontation. In this paper we have point­
ed at a number of indications, possibilities and trends 
which could be interpreted in this light. Indeed the 
history of Cyprus is as much one of ethnic diversity 
and conflict as it is a history of ethnic coexistence. 
A reading of this history clearly suggests that ethnic 
conflict may have been equally the result of certain 
political choices and political misjudgements within 
Cyprus as it was the outcome of outside policies. 
But it is equally clear from the historical record that
1. This and the following paragraph draw on the con­
ceptualizations advanced in James M. Rosenau, ed., Interna­
tional Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1964, pp. 1-44 and idem, The Scientific Study of Foreign 
Policy, New York, Free Press, 1971, pp. 307-338.
2. Increasing indications of covert American involvement,
destabilizing activities and encouragement of local subversion 
in Cyprus, are becoming available. Cf. Stern, «Bitter Lessons,» 
for some hints in this direction.
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after the bitter experience of violent conflict both a 
maturity of political wills and the direction of social 
developments were pointing confidently toward con­
flict resolution.
There is nothing inexorable about ethnic conflict: 
complete ethnic assimilation and the creation of new 
unified nationalities is probably unrealistic to ex­
pect—and certainly we should not be understood 
to mean this when we talked of the possibilities of 
conflict resolution and political reintegration. But 
this is besides the point: ethnic coexistence based on 
mutual accommodation of fundamental needs and as­
pirations has proved possible wherever appro­
priate motivations could be put to work.3 What out­
side interference did in Cyprus was precisely to stifle 
the motivation for conflict regulation whenever it 
appeared. As a consequence Cyprus was never given 
even the chance to resolve its ethnic and political prob­
lems on its own. On the contrary both ethnic conflict 
and intra-ethnic dissension were always effectively ma­
nipulated by outside powers to promote their own ob­
jectives and designs on Cyprus. In this sense conflict 
within Cypriot society provided the needed oppor­
tunities to foreign intervention.
Therefore the claim that communal separation 
is the only workable solution to ethnic conflicts and, 
in the case of Cyprus, partition is the only alternative 
to continuing violence, appears very much like a self- 
fulfilling prophecy and conceptually is perhaps not 
unrelated to the failure of theories of ethnic conflict 
and political integration to take into account the dis­
ruptive effects of foreign interference. Characteris­
tically the argument for partition is advanced in the 
case of Cyprus but not in connection with many other 
ethnically diverse societies ridden with communal 
problems. Indeed in Cyprus partition could be a- 
chieved only at the price of a bloody invasion, a vicious 
war and a policy of genocide designed to destroy the 
basis of ethnic coexistence before any other alterna­
tive strategies of conflict resolution could be tested: 
the development of class based democratic politics 
to supplant ethnic cleavages, the new loyalties that a 
development-oriented welfare state could have nur­
tured, the shared stakes in a developing economy, 
a cultural dialogue to replace the antagonism of tra­
ditional nationalist symbols and stereotypes with the 
discovery of common experiences and values. All of 
these carried real possibilities of peace and coopera­
tion and it is for this reason that the fate of Cyprus 
is all the more tragic.
3. See Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided 
Societies, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 
29, January 1972, Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University.
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POSTSCRIPT
This profile of ethnic conflict in Cyprus was orig­
inally written in an attempt to increase awareness 
over the basic issues of the problem, after the dra­
matic explosion of the summer of 1974. The chron­
icle of ethnic politics in the island and pertinent 
international developments draws on relatively well 
established facts of history. Caught as we are in a 
continuing and fast moving crisis however, we must 
update in this postscript our references to more re­
cent events. When this paper was written, an eco­
nomic collapse of the badly shaken Republic of 
Cyprus, seemed within the sphere of probability. 
Fortunately this has not happened. Instead a miracle 
of economic survival seems to have been achieved, 
with outside assistance of course but drawing 
largely on the mobilization of the island’s own human 
and material resources. This achievement points once 
again at the soundness of public policy and the 
viability of a Cypriot polity. Survival however 
does not mean recovery; and full recovery 
cannot be realistically contemplated before the 
root-cause of the disaster is removed: that is 
foreign occupation of a large part of the island 
must first be terminated before reconstruction can 
be attempted on safe foundations. The fact of sur­
vival only points at the will and ability of the 
Cypriots to come to grips with their predicament.
This note of optimism is not meant to suggest that 
the odds of the problem are decreasing. If anything 
the possibility of a settlement is made more remote 
by the intensification of certain trends which we noted 
in closing our account of ethnic relations in the 
main body of the paper. The colonization of occu­
pied northern Cyprus by settlers from Asia Minor 
was stepped up in the fall of 1975. Anatolian peasants, 
out of the ethnological mosaic of Asia Minor, 
continued to be transported to Cyprus to change 
the ethnic balance in the population. The colo­
nisation has provoked not only the outcry of 
the Greek Cypriots, especially the refugees at whose 
expense the colonists are settled in occupied villages 
and towns, but also it has met with the discontent of 
the Turkish Cypriots who resent the presence of the 
intruders and in general the ruthless comportment 
of the occupation forces.
One of the most unfortunate developments in ethnic 
relations in the second half of 1975 has been the 
forced emigration to the north of the Turkish Cyp­
riots of southern Cyprus. These people were forced, at 
the insistence of their leadership, to abandon their 
villages and urban quarters in Paphos, Limassol and 
Larnaca and become involuntary migrants to the 
north. This was the product of a deal during inter­
communal talks in Vienna in July 1975. The movement 
of the Turkish Cypriots from the south was secured
in exchange of the toleration of the continuing pres­
ence of the Greek Cypriot population in occupied 
Karpass and the improvement of their treatment by 
the occupation forces. However a few months 
later, pressures on this unfortunate rural population 
are escalated to force them away from their ancestral 
hearths.
Thus the pattern of ethnic coexistence as it was set 
by a long shared history, is in the process of radical 
transformation. All this of course is brought about 
in order to create the conditions of a settlement that 
will finally meet the traditional Turkish objective 
of expansion in Cyprus, which at the moment is pre­
sented in the legal nomenclature of bizonal federa­
tion (after assuming in the past successively the 
names of partition, functional federation, cantoniza- 
tion, etc.). There can be no doubt that any such ar­
rangement will not solve the problem, but it will only 
perpetuate the confrontation in all its intensity. Bi­
zonal federation in the form demanded by Turkey 
will bring not only effective partition but also the 
establishment of a Turkish protectorate over the 
whole of Cyprus. The endemic instability that will 
certainly result will provide Turkey with new pretexts 
to complete the annexation of Cyprus in its entirety.
In any case the invasion and consequent dismem­
berment of Cyprus has radically altered the nature 
of the problem. It is not anymore a question of find­
ing a constitutional modus vivendi between two ethnic 
communities. This of course remains one of the cen­
tral issues but the most immediate and urgent prob­
lem at this moment is the fact of foreign invasion 
and occupation of a large part of the territory of a 
sovereign Republic. The problem is now more than 
ever before truly international and it is up to the 
international community to exercise pressures and 
impose sanctions upon its delinquent member to abide 
by the rules of world society and the law of nations. 
Only after the rectification of this grave violation 
of international law, can the problem of ethnic rela­
tions and the efforts for an accommodation return 
to the center of the stage where they deserve to be. 
Once again we fall back on the international dimen­
sion of the problem and the distortion of ethnic 
politics by outside factors. And by way of conclusion 
we may note that Congressional investigations un­
der way in Washington at the moment of this writing, 
are producing evidence vindicating our allegations 
about direct American involvement in the latest cri­
sis. After all it seems that either frenzied shuttle di­
plomacy or orchestrated apathy have always been de­
signed to promote the same objectives. Once the full 
details of this activity are made public, it will be up 
to a critical social science, studying the nature of 
contemporary imperialism, to establish the precise 
reasons for this involvement.
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